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Death Anyways:  Federal Habeas
Corpus Retroactivity Law and the
Decision in Schriro v. Summerlin
It is the raw material from which legal fiction is forged: a vi-cious murder, an anonymous psychic tip, a romantic encoun-
ter that jeopardized a plea agreement, an allegedly incompetent
defense, and a death sentence imposed by a purportedly drug-
addled judge.  But, as Mark Twain observed, “truth is often
stranger than fiction because fiction has to make sense.”1
The above commentary by the Ninth Circuit on Warren Wes-
ley Summerlin’s trip through the criminal justice system illus-
trates the bizarre circumstances of his case.  In short, the criminal
justice system failed him.  After being charged with murder and
having been appointed a lawyer who had a love affair with the
prosecutor,2 Summerlin was sentenced to death by a judge who
may have confused the facts of Summerlin’s case with those of
another capital defendant sentenced to death by the same judge
on the same day.3  Summerlin challenged the constitutionality of
having a judge determine his sentence at every turn, but he was
continually denied relief.4  Years after Summerlin exhausted his
* J.D., University of Oregon, 2005; B.A., Western Washington University, 2002.  I
would like to thank the following individuals: Douglas Park, Adjunct Professor of
Law and Assistant Attorney General with the Oregon Department of Justice, for his
valuable contributions and for teaching me everything I know about federal habeas
corpus law; editors Tim Hering and Jessica King for their thoughtful revisions; and
my wife, Jessica, and my parents, Chris and Kathi Russell, for their love, support,
and unearthly amounts of patience.
1 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom .
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (2004).
2 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1085-87.
3 Id . at 1089-91.  The judge was later disbarred for marijuana use (including usage
of marijuana during the period when Summerlin was sentenced to death). Id . at
1091; see also In re Disbarment of Marquardt, 503 U.S. 902 (1992); In re  Marquardt,
821 P.2d 161 (Ariz. 1991).
4 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1091-92.
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direct appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona  exe-
cuted an about-face, overturning itself and embracing the argu-
ment Summerlin had pushed for so long: Arizona’s capital
sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.5  Despite the Supreme Court’s decision that Arizona’s capi-
tal sentencing structure was constitutionally flawed at the time
Summerlin was sentenced, the state of Arizona continued its plan
to execute him,6 because new rules of criminal procedure do not
usually apply retroactively.7
The Ninth Circuit heard Summerlin’s case en banc and despite
its observation that new rules of criminal procedure usually do
not apply retroactively, the court held Ring  should apply retroac-
tively to Summerlin’s case.8  The court held there were two pri-
mary reasons for applying Ring  retroactively: (1) the Supreme
Court’s holding in Ring  was not a new rule of criminal proce-
dure, but a new substantive rule of criminal law; and (2) even if
the Ring  holding was perceived as procedural, it fit one of the
exceptions to the general presumption that new rules of criminal
procedure do not apply retroactively.9  This holding had the prac-
tical effect of overturning the death sentences of over one hun-
dred prisoners in five different states.10 Arguably, it also had the
effect of lowering the bar for applying new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure retroactively.  Not surprisingly, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision.11
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court overturned the
Ninth Circuit, holding that Ring  does not apply retroactively to
prisoners challenging their capital sentences in a collateral pro-
ceeding.12  The Supreme Court first held that, contrary to the
Court of Appeals’ finding, Ring  was not a new substantive rule,
but a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure .13  The Court
also held that Ring did not apply retroactively under the Teague
“watershed” exception because having a judge as the fact-finder
5 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
6 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1091.
7 Id . at 1096.
8 Id . at 1084.
9 Id.  at 1121.
10 See  Adam Liptak, Judges’ Rulings Imposing Death are Overturned , N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2003, at A1.
11 Schriro v. Summerlin, 540 U.S. 1045 (2003).
12 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2526 (2004).
13 Id . at 2524.
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during the sentencing proceeding did not “seriously diminish”
the accuracy of the sentencing proceeding.14  The Supreme
Court’s opinion clarified Teague retroactivity law, reemphasized
the “accuracy” element of the watershed exception to Teague’s
retroactivity bar, and maintained the overall narrowness of the
watershed exception.
This Comment discusses both the Ninth Circuit’s Summerlin
and Supreme Court’s Schriro opinions in an attempt to explain
the two courts’ reasoning and to illustrate the significant and con-
tentious elements of the Schriro  opinion.  It is also the goal of
this Comment to sketch the contours of retroactivity law on col-
lateral review and to come to conclusions on the state of the law
in such a way that it extends beyond the immediate case
presented to the Supreme Court.  This Comment will show that
there are aspects of retroactivity law that could be substantially
affected by a court following the reasoning employed by the
Ninth Circuit in its Summerlin decision.  In many ways, the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion would have significantly lowered the bar for
when a new constitutional criminal rule is applied retroactively
on collateral review.  Finally, this Comment discusses the prece-
dential effects that the Supreme Court’s Schriro  opinion will
have on future retroactivity litigation by specifically focusing on
Schriro ’s impact on the possible retroactive application of
Blakely v. Washington ,15 a new rule of criminal procedure an-
nounced by the Supreme Court that could affect thousands of
cases.  Because Ring  (the rule examined in Schriro) and Blakely
both derive from applications of the Court’s holding in Apprendi
v. New Jersey ,16 the Court’s Schriro analysis will likely be ex-
tremely influential on the inevitable litigation over whether
Blakely  applies retroactively.
Part I of this Comment reviews the background law regarding
retroactive application of new constitutional rules dealing with
criminal matters on collateral review.  Part II discusses the back-
ground law of Summerlin’s case, including an explanation of the
Supreme Court’s Ring decision as well as a general discussion of
retroactivity law.  Part III explains the Ninth Circuit’s holding
and reasoning in Summerlin’s case, and Part IV discusses these
elements of the Supreme Court’s opinion.  Finally, Part V dis-
14 Id . at 2525.
15 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
16 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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cusses the implications of these decisions on retroactivity law.
First, it begins by discussing the impact on retroactivity law of the
Supreme Court’s clarified discussion of the distinction between
substantive and procedural rules.  Second, it discusses the effect
of the Court’s Schriro  opinion on the second Teague exception,
explaining how the Court maintained an extremely high hurdle
for petitioners to clear in order to have new constitutional rules
of criminal procedure apply retroactively to them.  To conclude,
this Comment discusses Schriro’s  impact on Blakely , in an effort
to illustrate the likely effects Schriro will have on that important
case as well as other cases in the future.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 29, 1981, Warren Wesley Summerlin brutally mur-
dered Brenna Bailey, a delinquent-account investigator who
came to Summerlin’s house to speak with his wife about an over-
due account.17  As a result of his actions, Summerlin was con-
victed of both first-degree murder and sexual assault.18  Pursuant
to Arizona state law at the time, Summerlin received a sentenc-
ing hearing over which the trial judge presided to determine
whether Summerlin would be sentenced to life imprisonment or
death.19  The judge sentenced Summerlin to death.20
Summerlin appealed his conviction and sentence.21  One of the
issues Summerlin raised on appeal was that Arizona’s law of a
judge, not a jury, sentencing him to death was unconstitutional.22
However, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected that argument,
along with the rest of his claims, and affirmed Summerlin’s con-
viction and death sentence.23
17 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom .
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
18 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1088.
19 Id . at 1088-89; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 1983) (amended
2002).
20 Summerlin , 341 F.3d. at 1089.  The sentencing hearing was extremely short.  It
began with the State submitting one exhibit and then asking the judge to consider
the trial testimony. Id .  Summerlin’s attorney then called a doctor who had con-
ducted a psychological evaluation on Summerlin, id . at 1085-86, but Summerlin told
his attorney that he did not want the doctor to testify. Id . at 1089.  The State con-
cluded the sentencing hearing by calling two rebuttal psychiatric witnesses. Id .
21 State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686 (Ariz. 1983).
22 Id . at 695.
23 Id . at 696.
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Summerlin next attempted to have his conviction overturned
four different times in state court, all to no avail.24  He then peti-
tioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court but was
once again denied.25  He appealed this judgment and a divided
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
his conviction in part and remanded to the federal district court
for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Summerlin’s
sentencing judge was competent when he sentenced Summerlin
to death.26
In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in State v. Ring27 to reexamine whether Arizona’s capi-
tal sentencing scheme, which allowed judges to find the facts nec-
essary to sentence persons to death, was constitutional.28  This
was an issue Summerlin had raised both at the state and federal
levels, thus far with no success.29  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
withdrew its decision to remand the case to the district court for
an evidentiary hearing and deferred submission of the case until
the United States Supreme Court resolved Ring .30  Undoubtedly
to Summerlin’s satisfaction, in Ring v. Arizona31 the Supreme
Court held that Arizona’s capital sentencing procedure of having
judges determine the aggravating factors necessary to impose a
sentence of death violated the Sixth Amendment right to a trial
by jury.32
Following Ring , Summerlin requested that the Arizona Su-
preme Court recall the mandate in his direct appeal to apply
Ring to his case.33  The Arizona Supreme Court denied Summer-
lin’s motion to recall the mandate34 and the Ninth Circuit voted
to rehear Summerlin’s case en banc.35
24 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1091.
25 Id .
26 Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926, 957 (9th Cir. 2001).
27 200 Ariz. 267 (2001), rev’d , 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
28 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1091.
29 Id .
30 Summerlin v. Stewart, 281 F.3d 836, 837 (9th Cir. 2002).
31 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
32 Id . at 609. See also  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1091.
34 Id .
35 Summerlin v. Stewart, 310 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2002).
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II
BACKGROUND LAW
A. The Ring Ruling and Related Authority
Because the primary issue the Supreme Court decided in Sum-
merlin  was whether its holding in Ring  applied retroactively, it is
worth first discussing the Ring  decision.  In that case, Ring was
convicted of felony murder.36  As with the law under which Sum-
merlin was sentenced, Ring was sentenced to death after a judge
found aggravating factors that supported a death sentence.37
Ring appealed his sentence, arguing “Arizona’s capital sentenc-
ing scheme violate[d] the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution because it entrust[ed] to a judge the finding
of a fact raising the defendant’s maximum penalty.”38
The State of Arizona relied on Walton v. Arizona ,39 a United
States Supreme Court opinion that upheld Arizona’s capital sen-
tencing scheme.40  In Walton , the Court held that “‘the Sixth
Amendment does not require that the specific findings authoriz-
ing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the
jury.’”41  The Court noted the aggravating factors necessary to be
found by a judge before imposition of a death sentence were not
“elements of the offense,” but were more like “sentencing
considerations.”42
Despite this obviously persuasive precedent, Ring relied on
two recent Supreme Court cases that cast doubt on Walton ’s va-
lidity.43  In the first, Jones v. United States ,44 the Supreme Court
held:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment,
any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maxi-
mum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.45
36 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 591 (2002).
37 Id.  at 592.
38 Id . at 595.
39 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
40 Ring , 536 U.S. at 595.
41 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490
U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per curiam)).
42 Id . at 648.
43 Ring , 536 U.S. at 595.
44 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
45 Id . at 243 n.6.
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The second helpful opinion to Ring’s case was Apprendi v.
New Jersey .46  In that case, Apprendi fired several shots into the
home of an African-American family.47  He pleaded guilty to
possession of a firearm, a conviction that, standing on its own,
carried a maximum sentence of ten years.48  However, after the
plea was entered the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance Ap-
prendi’s sentence based on a state hate-crime statute.49  That
statute allowed a sentencing judge to enhance a sentence beyond
the statutory maximum when the judge found by a preponder-
ance of evidence that the crime was committed with the purpose
of intimidating a person or group because of race.50  The judge in
Apprendi’s case found the crime was racially motivated and sen-
tenced Apprendi to twelve years in prison, two years beyond the
statutory maximum without the aggravating factor.51
The Apprendi Court held that this practice of allowing a sen-
tencing judge to find the racial motivation aggravator, by only a
preponderance of evidence, violated the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury and the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process
of law.52  The Court reasoned that the state “threatened Ap-
prendi with certain pains if he unlawfully possessed a weapon
and with additional  pains if he selected his victims with a purpose
to intimidate them because of their race.”53  The Court stated
that determining whether a factor for a greater sentence was a
“finding of fact,” therefore subject to the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury and the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, or a mere “sentencing factor,” properly determined by a
sentencing judge, is a question “not of form, but of effect.”54
Rather than overruling Walton , the Apprendi  Court concluded
that Apprendi’s case was distinguishable.55  The Court explained
that when a capital sentencing judge was required to find aggra-
46 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
47 Id . at 469.
48 Id . at 470.
49 Id .
50 Id . at 468-69.
51 Id . at 471.
52 Id . at 477.  The role of the Fourteenth Amendment in Apprendi  was more than
holding the Sixth Amendment against the State of Arizona.  The Due Process
Clause also “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.” In re  Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
53 Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added).
54 Id . at 494, 482-83.
55 Id . at 496-97.
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vating factors to impose a death sentence, the jury had already
decided the defendant was guilty of capital murder with a maxi-
mum penalty of death.56  In that situation, the judge merely de-
termines whether that maximum penalty should be imposed.57
Justice O’Connor’s dissent called this distinction “baffling.”58
Justice O’Connor quite persuasively noted “[a] defendant con-
victed of first-degree murder in Arizona cannot receive a death
sentence unless a judge makes the factual determination that a
statutory aggravating factor exists.  Without that critical finding,
the maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is life
imprisonment.”59
In Ring , however, the Court held “Walton  and Apprendi
[were] irreconcilable,” and overruled the former.60  It overruled
Walton  “[b]ecause Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors op-
erate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater of-
fense,’ [and] the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found
by a jury.”61  In other words, the Court held that a capital sen-
tencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment “to the extent that
it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an ag-
gravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death
penalty.”62  The Court reasoned that “in effect,” the finding of a
death sentence under Arizona law required a finding of fact.63  It
noted that Arizona’s labeling  the required aggravating findings
“sentencing factors” would not mean the Sixth Amendment does
not apply.64  Accepting such an argument would reduce Ap-
prendi  “to a ‘meaningless and formalistic’ rule of statutory
drafting.”65
B. Retroactivity and  Teague v. Lane
When the Supreme Court issues a new constitutional rule, one
might intuitively think the new rule would apply to every citizen
of the United States.  In fact, new judicial rulings generally apply
56 Id .
57 Id .
58 Id . at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
59 Id .
60 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
61 Id . (quoting Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
62 536 U.S. at 609.
63 Id . at 604.
64 Id .
65 Id . (quoting Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 541 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
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both prospectively and retroactively.66  However, there are some
situations where the Supreme Court will not apply judicial rul-
ings retroactively.67  In the landmark case Teague v. Lane ,68 the
Supreme Court held that new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure  is one of those areas, at least with respect to cases that
are considered final before the new rule is announced.69  The
Court held that for such rules there is a presumption against ap-
plying the rule retroactively, stating, “[u]nless they fall within an
exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have be-
come final before the new rules are announced.”70  That is, a new
rule of criminal procedure will not affect persons who have ex-
hausted their direct appeals and are challenging their convictions
or sentences on a collateral attack.
In coming to its determination that constitutional rules of crim-
inal procedure generally would not be applied retroactively, the
Court noted in Teague  that it “never has defined the scope of the
writ [of habeas corpus] simply by reference to a perceived need
to assure that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial
free of constitutional error,”71 but rather has “recognized that in-
terests of comity and finality must . . . be considered in determin-
ing the proper scope of habeas review.”72  Although many have
noted that nonretroactivity leads to arbitrarily denying some de-
fendants their constitutional rights because the judiciary-created
errors were corrected too late,73 the Court highlighted the frus-
trations of applying new constitutional rules of criminal proce-
dure on collateral review: a lack of finality, which undermines the
66 See, e.g. , 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 25.2, at 1034 n.1 (4th ed. 2001), which cites Landgraf
v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994) (noting general “rule that ‘a court is to
apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision’”) (quoting Bradley v. Rich-
mond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1994)).
67 See, e.g. , Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965).
68 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality).
69 Id . at 310.
70 Id .
71 Id . at 308 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986)) (plurality
opinion).
72 489 U.S. at 308.
73 See, e.g. , Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring)
(“[E]xecuting people because their cases came too early—because their appeals en-
ded before the Supreme Court belatedly came to the realization that it had made a
grievous constitutional error . . . is surely arbitrariness that surpasses all bounds.”).
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entire criminal process.74
However, Teague  stated two exceptions to the general pre-
sumption against retroactive application of new rules of criminal
procedure: (1) if the rule “place[d] certain kinds of primary, pri-
vate individual conduct beyond the criminal law-making author-
ity to proscribe”;75 or (2) if the rule “require[d] the observance of
those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.”76  There are two elements to the Court’s second excep-
tion to the rule of nonretroactivity for constitutional rules of
criminal procedure.77  First, the new rule must be a “watershed
rule of criminal procedure” that “will properly alter our under-
standing of the bedrock procedural elements  that must be found
to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.”78  Second, the
new rule must “significantly improve the pre-existing factfinding
procedures,”79 in a way that “the likelihood of an accurate con-
viction [has been] seriously diminished.”80  The Court has noted
this second exception is quite narrow and should be employed on
an infrequent basis.81  In fact, in Beard v. Banks  the Supreme
Court recently noted that “because any qualifying rule ‘would be
so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt . . .’
74 Teague , 489 U.S. at 309, 310 (“Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of
much of its deterrent effect.”) (“[S]tate courts are understandably frustrated when
they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal court discover,
during a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional commands.) (quoting Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 108 n.33).
75 Teague , 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
76 Teague , 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey , 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part)).  Although Teague  was a plurality opinion, the
next year a majority of justices made clear that the opinion substantially limited the
retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to these two
narrow exceptions for cases that reached the habeas corpus stage before the new
rule was announced. See Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990); Saffle v. Parks,
494 U.S. 484, 487-88 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 409 (1990).
77 Teague , 489 U.S. at 312.
78 Id . at 311 (quoting Mackey , 401 U.S. at 693-94 (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
79 Teague , 489 U.S. at 312 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
80 Teague , 489 U.S. at 313.
81 See, e.g. , Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) (the second exception
“clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules”); Sawyer , 497 U.S. at 243 (“[I]t
is ‘unlikely that many such components of basis due process have yet to emerge.’”)
(quoting Teague); Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1043 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating
a new rule under the second exception “must be so fundamentally important that its
announcement is a ‘groundbreaking occurrence’”) (quoting Caspari v. Bohlen, 510
U.S. 383, 396 (1994)).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE407.txt unknown Seq: 11  5-MAY-05 11:55
Death Anyways 1399
it should come as no surprise that we have yet to find a new rule
that falls under the second Teague  exception.”82  Further, the
Court noted that “[i]n providing guidance as to what might fall
within this exception, we have repeatedly referred to the rule of
Gideon v. Wainwright . . . (right to counsel), and only to this
rule,”83 which indicates a very narrow view of the second Teague
exception.84  Indeed, the same year Teague  was announced, in
Penry v. Lynaugh , the Court held the Teague  nonretroactivity
rule applied in capital cases.85  Although Teague exceptions are
supposed to be rare, this holding was surprising because it essen-
tially approved death sentences to persons who were denied cer-
tain procedural rights while there was still an opportunity to
remedy the wrong.
In Bousley v. United States , the Court clarified that this Teague
analysis only applies to new procedural  rules, not substantive
ones.86  Accordingly, a new constitutional rule will not be barred
from applying retroactively by Teague  if it is a new substantive
rule.87  Further, because new rules of substantive criminal law
generally apply retroactively,88 determining whether a new rule
is substantive or procedural is critical.  Although determining
whether a new rule is procedural or substantive can be difficult,89
in Bousley  the Court provided some guidance.  A decision of
“substantive criminal law,” the Court stated, is one that ad-
dresses the scope and application of a substantive federal crimi-
nal statute.90  The Court did not speak as to what is a rule of
procedure.
Of course, another issue that must be dealt with before a court
82 124 S. Ct. 2504, 2513-14 (2004) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478
(1993) (quoting Teague , 489 U.S. at 313)).  Interestingly, Beard  was decided by the
Supreme Court on the same day it decided Summerlin’s case. Compare Beard , 124
S. Ct. at 2504 with  Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
83 Beard , 124 S. Ct. at 2514 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
84 Beard , 124 S. Ct. at 2514; Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990); Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 (1989) (plurality opinion); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638,
653-54, 644 n.4 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
85 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989).
86 Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).
87 Id .
88 See, e.g. , Coleman v. United States, 329 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2003); Santana-
Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001); Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F.
Supp. 2d 1011, 1053 (D. Neb. 2003).
89 See, e.g. , Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973) (“[W]e would not suggest
that the distinction that we draw is an ironclad one that will invariably result in the
easy classification of cases in one category or the other.”).
90 Bousley , 523 U.S. at 620.
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evaluates whether a new rule of criminal procedure falls into one
of the two Teague exceptions is whether the rule is in fact
“new.”91  Determining whether a rule is new, as the Court noted
in Teague , can also be difficult.92  However, the Teague court
stated that:
In general . . . a case announces a new rule when it breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Fed-
eral Government . . . .  To put it differently, a case announces a
new rule if the result was not dictated  by precedent existing at
the time the defendant’s conviction became final.93
Although the Court has found it difficult to determine whether
a rule is new, in cases where a new case extends an old rule,94 the
Court has been quite clear when a case overrules an older one:
“[T]here can be no dispute that a decision announces a new rule
if it expressly overrules a prior decision.”95
In O’Dell v. Netherland ,96 the Supreme Court pulled all these
issues together, laying out three elements a court must address
under Teague : (1) the court must determine the date on which
the defendant’s conviction became final; (2) the court must de-
termine whether “a state court considering [the defendant’s]
claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt
compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he]
seeks was required by the Constitution”;97 and if not, then (3)
whether the new rule falls into one of the two Teague  exceptions
discussed above.98
By the time the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Summerlin ,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had already decided the
91 Whether a rule is “new,” for retroactivity purposes, is a matter of law and re-
viewed by federal courts de novo. See, e.g. , Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Smith, 496 U.S.
167, 177 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“The determination whether a constitutional de-
cision of this Court is retroactive . . . is a matter of federal law.”).
92 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
93 Id . (citations omitted).
94 Saffle v. Park, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990).  For a thorough discussion of the
Court’s difficulty in defining what constitutes a new rule, and its accordingly com-
plex jurisprudence in this area, see 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra  note 66, at 1064-
1106.
95 Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993). See also Saffle , 494 U.S. at 488
(1990) (“The explicit overruling of an earlier holding no doubt creates a new rule.”).
96 521 U.S. 151 (1997).
97 Id . at 156 (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997) (quoting
Saffle , 494 U.S. at 488 (alterations in Lambrix)).
98 521 U.S. at 156.  This approach was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.
See Beard v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 2510 (2004).
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exact issue of whether Ring applied retroactively under the
Teague doctrine.99  In Turner , the court first held that Ring an-
nounced a procedural rule, rather than a substantive one.100  It
reasoned that Ring was a procedural rule because it only affected
“what fact-finding procedure must be employed in a capital sen-
tencing hearing.”101  Further, Ring did not change the underlying
conduct or the burden of proof necessary to impose a death sen-
tence.102  The court also argued Ring’s holding was “procedural”
because it was a mere extension of Apprendi , a ruling that nu-
merous courts had already held was procedural.103
In Turner , the Eleventh Circuit also held that the rule from
Ring  did not fit either of the two exceptions stated in Teague .104
The court noted that the first Teague  exception clearly does not
apply to the Supreme Court’s Ring holding because it did not
“decriminalize any class of conduct or prohibit a certain category
of punishment.”105  Next, the court found that Ring  was not a
“watershed” rule that fit the second Teague exception because its
purpose was not to improve the accuracy of the sentencing pro-
cess.106  It argued that the new rule merely shifted “fact-finding
duties” from an impartial judge to an impartial jury.107  The point
of Ring  was not a problem with judges’ conducting sentencing,
99 Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2003).  The Ninth Circuit noted the
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1096 n.4 (9th
Cir. 2003).  Another case that spoke directly to this issue was the Arizona Supreme
Court’s application of Teague  to the Ring rule.  State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828 (Ariz.
2003).  In that case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Teague barred the United
States Supreme Court’s Ring holding from applying retroactively to the State’s pris-
oners with death sentences. Towery , 64 P.3d at 830.  The Ninth Circuit took note of
the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision, but heavily criticized it and eventually went
the other way from the state court’s holding. Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1106-07.  The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also held that Ring was not a substantive rule when
the Ninth Circuit decided Summerlin .  Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th
Cir. 2002).  Finally, Nevada’s Supreme Court also held that Ring did not apply retro-
actively under the Teague standard.  Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 470-73 (Nev.
2002).
100 Turner , 339 F.3d at 1284.
101 Id .
102 Id.
103 Id .  The Supreme Court, in Apprendi , stated that its holding was procedural
and did not go to the substance of the offense.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 475 (2000).
104 Turner , 339 F.3d at 1285.
105 Id . (quoting McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotations omitted)).
106 Turner , 339 F.3d at 1286.
107 Id .
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but was an enlightened reading of the Sixth Amendment.108
III
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING AND RATIONALE IN
SUMMERLIN V. STEWART
The Ninth Circuit had two alternative holdings for applying
Ring  retroactively.109  First, it found that the Ring  holding, al-
though partially procedural for Teague  purposes, was a ruling of
substantive criminal law.  Because Ring  affected the substance of
criminal law, the court held it was not subject to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Teague .110  Second, the Ninth Circuit held that
even if Ring  were seen as a procedural rule, it still fit the second
exception stated in Teague : the holding was a watershed rule that
improved the accuracy of the underlying proceeding.111
A. Ring Announced a New Substantive Rule of Criminal Law
In Summerlin , the Ninth Circuit first noted that Ring  created
at least a partially procedural rule.112  The court observed that
Ring  really just changed who found the facts, from judge to
jury.113  However, it found that Ring  went beyond that simple
facial change of “who decides.”  The court also found that the
rule at issue in Ring,  despite being partially procedural, was a
new substantive rule for Teague  purposes.114
The Ninth Circuit used an intriguing argument to find that the
Supreme Court established a new substantive rule in Ring .  It
observed that prior to Ring,  the State claimed a jury was decid-
ing, at the original criminal trial, whether the defendant was
guilty of capital murder.115  The State’s theory, then, was that the
judge was imposing a sentence on the jury’s already-determined
capital murder verdict.  However, as Ring  pointed out, this was
not really the case.  Rather, the jury decided whether the defen-
dant was guilty of murder, as charged in the indictment, and then
the judge determined whether aggravating factors, which were
termed the “functional equivalent” of criminal elements by the
108 Id.
109 Id . at 1108.
110 Id . at 1099-1108.
111 Id . at 1108-21.
112 Id . at 1101.
113 Id .
114 Id .
115 Id . at 1101-02.
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Ring  Court,116 were present before the judge had statutory au-
thority to impose a death sentence.  The way the Ninth Circuit
saw it, the Ring  Court created an entirely new substantive struc-
ture of murder law in Arizona—murder at the trial level and cap-
ital  murder at the sentencing level, for which one would receive
the death penalty.117  The court called this reordering of murder
law a change from one offense (capital murder), pre-Ring , to a
two-offense structure, post-Ring .118
To better understand how the Ninth Circuit saw a substantive
change in law after Ring , it is helpful to consider what the Su-
preme Court said in Ring .  There the Court reasoned that Ari-
zona could not have judges finding the aggravating factors
necessary to impose a death sentence, because those were factual
findings subject to the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee to a jury finding facts beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.119  Accordingly, if a jury is necessary at the sentencing
level, there is no difference between the trial for innocence and
guilt (termed simple “murder” by the Ninth Circuit) and the trial
for death or life imprisonment (termed “capital murder” by the
Ninth Circuit).  Elements must be found at each stage.  If ele-
ments must be found at the sentencing stage, and not mere sen-
tencing factors, then the Supreme Court, theoretically speaking,
created a new substantive law.  Put into its shortest form, capital
murder is the highest kind of “murder” in Arizona.
To support this perception of the holding in Ring , the Ninth
Circuit examined the history of capital sentencing in Arizona.120
The court noted that from 1919 to 1972, Arizona left capital sen-
tencing in the complete discretion of the jury.121  However, in the
wake of Furman v. Georgia ,122 finding complete discretion of
judge or jury unconstitutional, Arizona’s substantive capital sen-
tencing structure was eliminated.123  After 1973, Arizona judges
determined whether a defendant would be sentenced to death,124
with various changes to its structure mandated by Supreme Court
116 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000)).
117 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 2003).
118 Id . at 1105.
119 Ring , 536 U.S. at 609.
120 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1102-05.
121 Id . at 1102.
122 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
123 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1103 (citing In re Tarr, 109 Ariz. 264 (1973)).
124 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1102-03.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE407.txt unknown Seq: 16  5-MAY-05 11:55
1404 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
decisions.125  The court of appeals then discussed its opinion in
Adamson v. Ricketts ,126 where it held the Arizona capital sen-
tencing structure’s aggravating factors were elements of the dis-
tinct offense of capital murder.127  However, the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion in Adamson  was overruled by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Walton .128  According to the court’s reasoning, once Ring
overruled Walton , the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the ag-
gravating factors were elements of the distinct crime of capital
murder was restored.129
In noting that Ring  was both a procedural and substantive de-
cision, the Ninth Circuit found that all states must comply with
the minimum procedural requirements outlined in Ring .130 How-
ever, the court went on to state, as described above, that Ring
was a substantive decision that should be applied
retroactively.131
Because Ring merely extended the reasoning from Apprendi ,
and because the Ninth Circuit, and all other circuits, had found
Apprendi was a procedural rule not applying retroactively,132 the
court distinguished Ring  and Apprendi  on the substantive/proce-
dural distinction.133  It reasoned that in Apprendi  the Supreme
Court directly stated New Jersey’s substantive criminal law was
not at issue,134 but in Ring  the substantive law was at issue.135  By
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the Supreme Court rendered a
“wholesale invalidation of Arizona’s capital sentencing
125 See, e.g.,  Alford v. Eyman, 408 U.S. 939 (1972); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
126 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
127 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1104.
128 Id .
129 Id . at 1104-05.
130 Id . at 1106.
131 Id .
132 See, e.g. , United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(holding that Apprendi  was not a substantive determination, but applying the rule
retroactively nevertheless, because the care arose on direct review); Goode v.
United States, 305 F.3d 378, 382-85 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Sanchez-
Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 670 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding Apprendi did not apply retro-
actively under a Teague analysis for a case on collateral review); McCoy v. United
States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993,
999-1000 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 149-51 (4th Cir.
2001).
133 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1101-02, 1102 n.9.
134 Id . at 1101 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475 (2000)).
135 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1101.
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scheme.”136  The court relied on its reasoning that in capital cases
the circumstances are unique in that the two crimes of capital
murder and plain murder were split apart from the old (and un-
constitutional) structure of just one class of murder, and that in
creating such a new dichotomized structure in Ring , the Supreme
Court had struck down the entire substantive law of murder in
Arizona.137
B. Teague Analysis
Applying the three-step Teague  analysis described above, the
Ninth Circuit first observed that Summerlin’s conviction was fi-
nal when the Arizona Supreme Court denied “rehearing of its
opinion affirming his conviction and death sentence in 1984.”138
The court next determined that Ring  announced a new rule that
was not available to the Arizona courts before Summerlin ex-
hausted all of his direct appeals.139
The court went on to determine whether either of the Teague
exceptions applied to the Ring  holding.140  The Ninth Circuit first
held that “[b]ecause Ring  did not ‘decriminalize a class of con-
duct nor prohibit the imposition of capital punishment on a par-
ticular class of persons, the first [Teague ] exception is
inapplicable’ to the instant ruling.”141  However, the court also
held that the Ring  holding, if seen as a new procedural rule, fit
the second Teague  exception, thereby providing an alternative
reason for applying the new constitutional rule retroactively.142
The court had several grounds for finding that Ring  enhanced
the accuracy of the proceeding.143  First, the court found that the
new rule, on its face, improved the accuracy of the sentencing
proceeding.144  The court, citing Sawyer v. Smith ,145 noted that all
capital sentencing procedures are aimed at improving the relia-
bility and accuracy of the proceeding at issue.146
136 Id .
137 Id .
138 Id . at 1108 (citing State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686 (Ariz. 1984)).
139 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1109.
140 Id .
141 Id . (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 477 (1993) (quoting Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
142 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1121.
143 Id . at 1110-16.
144 Id . at 1110.
145 497 U.S. 227, 243 (1990).
146 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1110.
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Second, the court found that “fact-finding by a jury, rather
than by a judge, is more likely to heighten the accuracy of capital
sentencing proceedings.”147 It observed that sentencing proceed-
ings with juries tend to resemble trial-like settings, with “orderly
presentation of evidence and argument.”148  The court noted
penalty-phases presented to judges resembled mere ordinary
sentencing proceedings.149  It also argued that this resulted in a
significant amount of inadmissible evidence being used to decide
a defendant’s fate.150  The court believed that these problems
with the sentencing proceedings presented to judges led to less
accurate determinations than would an orderly presentation to a
jury.151
Third, the court argued that a large part of capital sentencing is
the moral decision of deciding when a person should be sen-
tenced to death.152  It noted that a jury is better equipped to ex-
press the moral decision of whether to sentence a capital
defendant to death because jurors are people from the commu-
nity of the defendant.153  Also, because judges regularly sentence
criminal defendants and may even regularly confront death pen-
alty cases, the judge may be “hardened,” or at least far “less
likely to reflect the current conscience of the community.”154  Fi-
nally, the court of appeals noted that judges are affected by polit-
ical pressures from having to run for office, suggesting that




149 Id . at 1110-11.
150 Id . at 1111-12.
151 Id . at 1113.
152 Id.
153 Id .
154 Id . at 1114.
155 Id . (citing John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty
Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study , 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 470-75
(1999)); Stephen B. Bright et al., Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising
Threats to Judicial Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases , 31 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123 passim  (1999); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan,
Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next
Election in Capital Cases , 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 793-94 (1995); Sam Kamin, Harmless
Error and the Rights/Remedies Split , 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 62 (2002); Politics and the
Death Penalty:  Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Politi-
cal Pressure? , 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 270-73 (1994); Fred B. Burnside, Com-
ment, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the Jury Override , 1999 WIS. L. REV.
1017, 1039-44 (1999).
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The Ninth Circuit also found that Ring  announced a new wa-
tershed rule.156  It first found the Ring ruling “fundamentally al-
tered the procedural structure of capital sentencing applicable to
all states.”157  This restructuring of capital sentencing was so fun-
damental, according to the court, that it was a structural change
in capital sentencing procedure that led to a finding that Ring
was a watershed rule.158  Providing support for the finding that
Ring  announced a “structural” change in capital sentencing was
the fact that Ring error is not capable of harmless-error re-
view.159  The court pointed out that because “the wrong entity
found Summerlin to be guilty of a capital crime . . . there was no
jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and no
constitutionally cognizable finding to review.”160  Put another
way, the court could only speculate as to what the effect of the
error in Summerlin’s sentencing proceeding was because Sum-
merlin was provided the wrong fact-finder and the court would
have to guess what a “hypothetical jury” would have done.161
The court concluded by stating that “Ring  error is one ‘affecting
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than sim-
ply an error in the trial process itself.’”162
To complete its watershed analysis, the court of appeals ex-
amined whether Ring  was “truly watershed,” and so fundamental
that it announced a right “implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty.”163  The Ninth Circuit found Ring  was such a ruling.164  It
first noted Ring ’s impact was far greater than the impact of the
“Mills/McKoy” rule which was found to be a “watershed rule” by
other circuits.165  The Mills/McKoy  rule holds that a state may
not limit mitigating evidence from the jury’s consideration of a
capital sentence, even if the jury is not uninanimous in finding
156 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1116-21.
157 Id . at 1116.
158 Id .
159 Id . at 1116-17.
160 Id . at 1117.
161 Id . (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993)); Bollenbach v.
United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946).
162 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8
(1999) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991))).
163 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1119 (citations omitted).
164 Id . at 1121.
165 Id . at 1120.  Ironically, after the Ninth Circuit issued its Summerlin opinion,
the Supreme Court held that the new Mills  rule does not apply retroactively, specifi-
cally noting that Mills /McKoy  did not announce a new watershed rule.  Beard v.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2004).
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the mitigating evidence.166  Comparing the Ring rule to the Mills/
McKoy  rule, the Ninth Circuit observed that “Ring  does not
merely announce a supplemental procedural safeguard.”167  The
court also noted that Ring rendered the constitutionality of one-
fourth of capital punishment states’ sentencing procedures inva-
lid, and affected every single capital sentencing scheme in the
country.168  Accordingly, Ring  “altered the fundamental bedrock
principles applicable to capital murder trials.”169
The Ninth Circuit also had to distinguish Ring  from Apprendi
because in United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes , the Ninth Circuit
held Apprendi  did not apply retroactively under a Teague analy-
sis.170  Clearly, holding Apprendi  not to apply retroactively was
related to whether the court should hold that Ring applies retro-
actively, because the Supreme Court had stated Ring  was merely
an extension of Apprendi .  The court distinguished Apprendi
from Ring , for retroactivity purposes, in at least five ways: (1)
Apprendi  was not a decision of substantive law, in that it did not
declare the statute unconstitutional; (2) Apprendi  errors are not
structural and are subject to harmless-error review; (3) Apprendi
did not improve the accuracy of the sentencing proceeding and it
was not sweeping because it would apply only in a limited num-
ber of cases; (4) capital cases are structurally different than non-
capital cases because the sentencing proceeding of a capital case
with a jury resembles a trial; and (5) the Eighth Amendment of
the Constitution imposes a heightened analysis on capital trials
that was not present in the analysis of Apprendi .171
IV
THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING AND RATIONALE
The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision
that Ring applied retroactively.172  The Court addressed the two
166 McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 435 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367, 384 (1988).
167 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1120.
168 Id . (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 621 (2002) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing)); Brief for Amici Curiae Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York District Attorney’s Ass’n,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia In Support of Respondent to the Su-
preme Court in Ring  at 4 n.2 (No. 01-488), available at  2002 WL 481140.
169 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1120.
170 282 F.3d 664, 670 (9th Cir. 2002).
171 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1121.
172 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2527 (2004).
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primary holdings found by the Ninth Circuit, disagreeing with
both of them.173  First, the Court ruled that Ring did not an-
nounce a new substantive rule, because it merely altered the pro-
cedure for determining whether a person is subject to a death
sentence.174  Second, the Court found that Ring  did not fit the
second Teague exception, because judicial fact-finding does not
seriously diminish the accuracy of an underlying proceeding.175
Justice Breyer, joined by three other Justices,176 filed a dissenting
opinion arguing that there were three reasons the accuracy in
Summerlin’s sentencing proceeding was seriously diminished in
light of the Court’s Ring  holding.
A. Ring Is Not a New Rule of Criminal Procedure
The Court began by making a somewhat significant clarifica-
tion to retroactivity law.  It initially explained that new substan-
tive rules apply retroactively, citing Bousley , “as well as
constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or
persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to pun-
ish,” which is the first Teague exception.177  The Court went on to
note that the Bousley rule is not separate from this first Teague
exception.178  Specifically, the Court stated, “[w]e have some-
times referred to rules of this latter type as falling under an ex-
ception to Teague ’s bar on retroactive application of procedural
rules . . . they are more accurately characterized as substantive
rules not subject to the bar.”179  Accordingly, the Court made
anomalous the Ninth Circuit’s holding that Ring was a substan-
tive rule under Bousley  which did not fit the first Teague
exception.
The Court then analyzed whether Ring announced a new sub-
stantive rule of criminal law.180  It explained that in making the
substantive/procedural distinction, a “rule is substantive rather
than procedural if it alters the range of conduct or the class of
persons that the law punishes,” but is procedural if it “regulate[s]
173 Id. at 2526-27.
174 Id . at 2523.
175 Id . at 2526.
176 Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. See id . at 2527.
177 Id . at 2522.
178 Id . at 2522-23, 2523 n.4.
179 Id . at 2522 n.4 (citation omitted).
180 Id . at 2523-24.
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only the manner of determining  the defendant’s culpability.”181
Applying this method of distinguishing the two, it found that
Ring  did not “alter the range of conduct Arizona law subjected
to the death penalty.”182  In fact, the Court noted that because
Ring  was decided entirely upon Sixth Amendment jury-trial
grounds, something that seems procedural on its face, it could
have “nothing to do with the range of conduct a State may
criminalize.”183  The opinion also noted that rules allocating deci-
sion-making authority are “prototypical procedural rules.”184
The Court also rejected Summerlin and the Ninth Circuit’s ar-
gument that Ring restructured the elements of Arizona’s aggra-
vated murder structure to create a new offense of “capital
murder.”185  It began by explaining that a decision which modi-
fies the elements of an offense usually announces a substantive
rule.186 However, the Court explained that modification of ele-
ments refers to the altering of “the range of conduct the statute
[in question] punishes.”187  In the case of Ring , there was no al-
tering of the range of conduct that was punishable after the opin-
ion.188  The Court in Ring  did not hold that certain elements
were necessary for Arizona to sentence a person to death.
Rather, Ring merely held that  Arizona must have juries decide
the elements that Arizona chose, because those elements were
“factual” elements.189  In other words, Ring  found that certain
sentencing elements, as labeled by the Arizona state legislature,
were the functional equivalent of criminal elements. Ring
merely relabeled Arizona’s sentencing aggravators by looking at
substance over form.  However, at the end of the day, this re-
labeling did not affect the conduct which is captured as criminal.
Rather, it was a relabeling that affected who decides, as pre-
scribed by the Sixth Amendment.190









190 The Court also criticized the Ninth Circuit’s holding for federalism reasons.  It
noted, as discussed in note 99, supra,  that the Arizona Supreme Court did not  find
that Ring reordered Arizona’s capital murder structure in State v. Towery , 64 P.3d
828, 832-33 (Ariz. 2003). Schriro , 124 S. Ct. at 2524.
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B. Ring Is Not a Watershed Rule of Criminal Procedure
Because the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s find-
ing that Ring announced a new substantive rule, it still had to
determine whether Ring fell under the watershed exception to
Teague .191  In making this determination, the Court did not
speak to whether Ring was a fundamental decision, “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.”192  Instead, it focused entirely on
whether a judicial determination of the aggravating factors under
Arizona’s pre-Ring  statute “seriously diminished [the] accuracy”
of Summerlin’s sentencing proceeding.193  Despite the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s list of reasons why juries are more accurate factfinders than
judges, the majority held that it did not.194  The Court stated that
rather than looking to see whether juries are better factfinders
than judges, the Court must determine “whether judicial factfind-
ing so ‘seriously diminishe[s]’ accuracy that there is an ‘imper-
missibly large risk’ of punishing conduct the law does not
reach.”195
Applying this standard, the Court found that evidence sup-
porting the questionability of judicial factfinding was too equivo-
cal to support a conclusion that the accuracy of Summerlin’s
sentencing proceeding was seriously diminished.196  Essentially, it
found that because there was no clear answer to whether judicial
factfinding is more or less accurate than that of juries, it could
not be said that the accuracy of Summerlin’s conviction was seri-
ously  diminished.197  The Court pointed out that “for every argu-
ment why juries are more accurate factfinders, there is another
why they are less accurate.”198  Upon finding this issue to be in-
conclusive and controversial, the Court stated, “[w]hen so many
presumably reasonable minds continue to disagree over whether
juries are better factfinders at all , we cannot confidently say that
191 Schriro , 124 S. Ct. at 2524.
192 Id . at 2527 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-
13 (1989)).
193 Schriro , 124 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
194 Id . at 2524-25.
195 Id . at 2525 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312-13 (1989) (quoting De-
sist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
196 Schriro , 124 S. Ct. at 2525.
197 Id .
198 Id.  The Court noted that although the Ninth Circuit majority listed reasons
why juries are more accurate, the dissent in the Ninth Circuit’s Summerlin  opinion
had advanced several arguments why juries are less  accurate than judges. Id .
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judicial factfinding seriously  diminishes accuracy.”199
The Court found precedential support for its finding that judi-
cial factfinding was not seriously inaccurate in the pre-Teague de-
cision of DeStefano v. Woods .200  In DeStefano  the Supreme
Court was presented with the issue of whether Duncan v. Louisi-
ana ,201 where the Court held that “the States cannot deny a re-
quest for jury trial in serious criminal cases,”202 applied
retroactively.203  The DeStefano court gave three different rea-
sons for holding that Duncan  did not apply retroactively,204 one
of which was important to the Schriro court.205  In finding that
the purpose of the Duncan  rule would not be served by retroac-
tive application, DeStefano  stated, “‘[w]e would not assert, how-
ever, that every criminal trial . . . held before a judge alone is
unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a
judge as he would be by a jury.’”206  In Schriro , the Court be-
lieved that this was a finding by the DeStefano Court that an
entire  criminal trial without a jury was not impermissibly inaccu-
rate.207  Accordingly, a judge finding only sentencing aggravators
could not be any more inaccurate.
The Schriro majority also addressed two significant points
from the dissent.208  First, in response to the dissent’s claim that
juries are more accurate because they are more adept at deciding
factors that call for the weighing of community standards, the
majority strictly read Arizona’s sentencing aggravators, noting
that nowhere did Arizona’s death sentence statute require them
to be “determined by community standards .”209  Second, in re-
sponse to the dissent’s arguments on the theme that death
sentences should be viewed differently when it comes to retroac-
tivity, the Court used formalistic reasoning, stating that this was
not an application of Teague , but of a different sort of balancing
199 Id .
200 Id . at 2525 (citing DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968)(per curiam)).
201 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
202 DeStefano , 392 U.S. at 632.
203 Id . at 633.
204 Id . at 633-34.
205 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2525-26 (2004).
206 DeStefano , 392 U.S. at 633-34 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158
(1968)).
207 Schriro , 124 S. Ct. at 2526.
208 Id .
209 Id .
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test that is nowhere found in Court precedent.210
C. Justice Breyer’s Dissent
Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by three other justices, began
with the assumption that Ring  announced a rule that meets the
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” piece of the Teague
exception, reasoning that the majority did not deny this piece of
the test and citing a number of cases that indicated the jury trial
right is a “fundamental guarantee.”211  Accordingly, like the ma-
jority, the dissent focused entirely on whether Ring significantly
undermined the accuracy of the underlying proceeding.212  The
dissent provided three primary reasons why having a judge as the
factfinder in a death-sentence proceeding seriously undermines
the accuracy of the proceeding.213
First, it noted that the necessary aggravators for a death sen-
tence are full of highly subjective, value-laden terms, which
clearly imply that they should be evaluated according to “com-
munity standards,” which can only be provided by a jury.214  Jus-
tice Breyer specifically pointed out one of Arizona’s aggravators,
which required a finding that the crime “was committed in an
‘especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.’”215
Second, Justice Breyer examined the policies underlying the
Teague rule of non-retroactivity and balanced these competing
interests to find that Ring should be applied retroactively.216  He
began by noting two objectives of habeas corpus law, specifically,
protecting the innocent and uniformity among all persons.217  He
argued that these considerations are more pointed in the death
penalty context because Eighth Amendment jurisprudence re-
quires greater scrutiny because of the severity and irrevocability
of the punishment.218  On the uniformity issue, the dissent noted
the arbitrariness of a person being put to death under a proce-
dure acknowledged as unconstitutional and how, in the death
penalty context, that is unique because none of the “sentence”
210 Id .  The Court noted that even if it were willing to reconsider Teague , it would
not be willing to adopt such a balancing formulation.
211 Id . at 2527 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
212 Id .
213 Id . at 2528.
214 Id .
215 Id . (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (West Supp. 2003)).
216 Schriro , 124 S. Ct. at 2528.
217 Id . at 2528.
218 Id . at 2528-29.
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has been carried out by the time the Court catches its constitu-
tional mistake.219  The dissent also discussed the policy interests
usually cited for not applying new rules of criminal procedure
retroactively and how these interests were not particularly
weighty in regards to Ring .220  The dissent noted that one inter-
est in non-retroactivity is conservation of state resources, but ar-
gued this was not weighty in this case because Ring only affected
approximately 110 individual cases.221  Further, finality, a policy
often cited for non-retroactivity, is not as important in the capital
context as in usual criminal cases because the death sentence
process goes on for many years anyway, and finality should be
discounted due to the nature of the sentence.222
Third, the dissent argued that the majority’s reliance on De-
Stefano  was not persuasive because DeStefano  was a pre-Teague
case and the majority singled out only one of the three factors
that DeStefano  relied on in coming to its conclusion.223  The dis-
sent noted that the other two factors discussed in DeStefano for
non-retroactivity of the Duncan rule were quite persuasive, while
the one factor seized by the Schriro Court was not as persuasive
standing on its own.224  Further, the dissent distinguished DeStef-
ano  by noting Ring  is quite different than the Duncan rule: it
applies to a small subclass of defendants; the relative harm was
greater to defendants deprived of Ring ; administration of justice
is not as difficult with Ring ; and there were hardly any reliance
interests damaged by Ring .225
V
IMPLICATIONS
A. The Supreme Court’s Substantive/Procedural Distinction
The Schriro  Court’s clarification of the substantive/procedural
distinction is a positive movement in the law of habeas retroac-
tivity for a number of reasons: it provides much need clarity in
the field; it is appropriate in light of Supreme Court precedent; it
follows the policies underlying the Teague  rule; and it will pro-
219 Id .
220 Id . at 2529-30.
221 Id . at 2530.
222 Id .
223 Id .
224 Id  at 2530-31.
225 Id . at 2531.
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vide far greater certainty for future retroactivity cases.  The
Court clarified that there are not two separate procedural Teague
exceptions and a separate substantive Bousley rule that can lead
to retroactive application of new rules of criminal law.226  Rather,
there is a rule of retroactivity for new substantive rules and a rule
of non-retroactivity for new procedural rules of criminal law, un-
less the new rule fits the one  “watershed” exception.227  This ex-
planation clarified a developing problem.  Namely, there
appeared to be little difference between the first Teague excep-
tion and what the Ninth Circuit termed the “substantive” excep-
tion to the non-retroactivity bar.  Nevertheless, courts began
analyzing Teague issues under such a framework.228  The result
was ambiguity, uncertainty, and bizarre results, such as the Ninth
Circuit’s highly tenuous finding that Ring announced a substan-
tive rule.229  A rule like Ring , about “who decides” in a sentenc-
ing proceeding, appears to be the classic example of a procedural
rule, as the Schriro  majority pointed out.230  For the Ninth Cir-
cuit to find to the contrary illustrates the pre-Schriro  framework
in this area of Teague jurisprudence was lacking.  Of course,
prior to Schriro  there was relatively little written on the distinc-
tion of substance and procedure in the habeas context,231 and as
the Ninth Circuit illustrated, the door was wide open for any fed-
eral court to overturn a state’s conviction if it so desired.  The
Supreme Court’s Schriro  opinion began to fill that gap.
The Supreme Court’s explanation of the difference between
procedural and substantive rules is simple and clear.  If a new
rule of constitutional criminal law “alters the range of conduct or
the class of persons that the law punishes,” then it is substantive
and applies retroactively.232  The focus is on whether the new
rule affects the number of people or the amount of conduct sub-
ject to the criminal statute under which the petitioner was con-
226 See infra  Part V.A.
227 Schriro , 124 S. Ct. at 2522-23, 2523 n.4.
228 See, e.g. , Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Coleman v.
United States, 329 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2003); Santana-Madera v. United States, 260
F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001).
229 Judge Rawlinson’s dissenting opinion in Summerlin  noted “the majority opin-
ion wanders afield” in its holding that Ring announced a substantive decision. Sum-
merlin , 341 F.3d at 1125.
230 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523 (2004).
231 Ethan Isaac Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive? , 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1805,
1828 (2003).
232 Schriro , 124 S. Ct. at 2523.
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victed.  In contrast, a new rule is procedural if it regulates the
“manner of determining the [criminal] defendant’s culpabil-
ity.”233  The critical piece for determining whether a rule is pro-
cedural, rather than substantive, appears to be whether it
addresses the “manner of determining” culpability.234  This stan-
dard does not leave room for courts to examine other factors,
like the Ninth Circuit’s tracing Arizona’s death penalty statute
throughout the twentieth century, to come to the conclusion that
Ring , a rule about who is the fact-finder, is a substantive rule of
criminal law.  The Schriro Court’s relatively simple and dichoto-
mous standard for determining whether a new rule is procedural
or not should cut off confusion when the Supreme Court issues
future rules of constitutional criminal law.
Further, Schriro’s holding regarding the substantive/pro-
cedural distinction appears to be in accord with the spirit of Su-
preme Court precedent on this issue.  The analysis begins by
closely looking at Bousley v. United States ,235 a case relied upon
by the Ninth Circuit in Summerlin  and the Supreme Court in
Schriro .236  In Bousley , the Supreme Court held that “because
Teague  by its terms applies only to procedural rules, we think it is
inapplicable to the situation in which this Court decides the
meaning of a criminal statute enacted by Congress.”237  The focus
of Bousley was whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey
v. United States238 applied retroactively on collateral review.239
Bailey  held that use of a firearm under a firearms statute240 re-
quired active employment as opposed to mere possession of the
firearm.241  In Bousley , the Court held the Bailey rule was not
barred by Teague  because the narrowing of the term “use” cre-
ated “a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of ‘an
act that the law does not make criminal.’”242  The opinion ob-
233 Id . (emphasis omitted).
234 Id .  This appeared to be an important piece to the Court, as the Court empha-
sized this phrase in text of its opinion.
235 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
236 See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003); Schriro , 124 S.
Ct. at 2523.  In fact, the Supreme Court cited Bousley  when giving its definition of
“substantive” and “procedural” rules. Schriro , 124 S. Ct. at 2523.
237 Bousley , 523 U.S. at 620.
238 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
239 Bousley , 523 U.S. at 618.
240 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
241 Bailey , 516 U.S. at 144.
242 Bousley , 523 U.S. at 620 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346
(1974)).
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served it would be “inconsistent with the doctrinal underpinnings
of habeas review”243 to bar collateral relief based on new rules
like Bailey , where the Court interpreted the relevant statute to
not reach certain conduct as criminal.244
Bousley  established that a substantive decision is one that pro-
vides that Teague will not block the retroactive application of a
new rule that alters the scope of a criminal statute.  The concern
in Bousley was that a new rule had been established significantly
limiting the amount of conduct that was “criminal” under a fed-
eral statute.  The Court’s Schriro  definition of “substantive”
looks directly at that concern—whether the new rule limits the
conduct  punishable as criminal. Bousley was never intended to
apply to a rule like Ring because the only shift that was made
was “who decides.”245  Accordingly, the Schriro Court’s formula-
tion of the substantive/procedural distinction appears to be more
in line with this precedent than the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.
The Schriro Court’s substantive/procedural distinction is also
in line with the underlying doctrinal principles of the Teague
rule.  Beginning in the mid-1960s, Justice Harlan began writing a
number of dissenting and concurring opinions which later be-
came the foundation for the Court’s non-retroactivity rule in
Teague .246  In explaining the first exception, Justice Harlan stated
that “[t]here is little societal interest in permitting the criminal
process to rest at a point where it ought properly never to re-
pose.”247  Justice Harlan went on further to give as an example
“[n]ew ‘substantive due process’ rules” that “free[ ] individuals
from punishment for conduct that is constitutionally pro-
tected.”248  This understanding of the first Teague exception illus-
trates that the determination of whether the new constitutional
243 Bousley , 523 U.S. at 621.
244 Id . at 620.
245 In fact, after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ring , the Arizona legisla-
ture amended the State’s capital sentencing statute. See  Act of Apr. 27, 2001, ch.
260, § 1, 2001 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1334, 1334 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 13-703.01 (2003)).  It did not change the terms of the aggravating factors necessary
to impose a sentence of death; rather, it only changed the factfinder from judge to
jury. Id .
246 See  United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 546-47 nn.9-10 (1982) (citing opin-
ions); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  For an account of the historical development of non-retro-
activity, see 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 66, § 25.2, at 1034-45.
247 Mackey , 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248 Id . at 692-93.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE407.txt unknown Seq: 30  5-MAY-05 11:55
1418 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
rule is substantive or procedural should focus on whether, in the
end, the rule limits conduct that may be punished as criminal.
Hertz and Liebman agree with this reading, stating, “[i]n general,
the first exception may be interpreted as distinguishing new rules
of substantive criminal law, which always apply retroactively,
from new rules of criminal procedure, which generally do not ap-
ply retroactively in cases that were final as of the time the new
rule was announced.”249  In other words, merging the Bousley
ruling with the first Teague exception fits the underlying policy
and intent of the original Teague  rule.
Aside from the Court’s precedent, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning that Ring  was a substantive rule averted the possibility
of not being able to find a logical end to what is not  substantive.
Particularly, the Ninth Circuit’s distinction of Ring  from Ap-
prendi  were unavailing, despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit
had held Apprendi does not apply retroactively.250  The Ninth
Circuit’s explanation that Ring  established “capital murder” and
plain “murder” in Arizona could just as easily have applied to
Apprendi .  One could say Apprendi  reorganized the elements of
assault plus the aggravator into two distinct crimes: assault and
hate-motivated assault.  The former was punishable by a maxi-
mum of ten years in New Jersey, the latter punishable by up to
twenty.  Accordingly, the reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit to
hold that Ring announced a substantive rule could apply to
countless situations and is the crux of the problem with the
court’s reasoning—it gutted the Teague rule.  It removed
whatever cases a court wants to exempt from the bar of retroac-
tivity.  A conception of the substantive/procedural distinction
without a clear ending point is problematic in this area because
such distinctions have never been easy.251  The Ninth Circuit’s
“non-existent” distinctions from Apprendi , as well as its overall
characterization of substantive versus procedural, provided fu-
ture courts with little guidance or potential consistency.  Not sur-
prisingly, the Supreme Court immediately corrected these
problems by its formulation of the substantive/procedural
distinction.
The Supreme Court’s policy interests in Teague ’s retroactivity
249 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 66, §25.7, at 1119.
250 See supra  Parts III.B, IV.A.
251 D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure” Revisited with Some After-
thoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 30 UCLA
L. REV. 189, 189-90 (1982).
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holding are also advanced by the Schriro Court’s substantive/
procedural distinction.  The Court has offered roughly three ex-
planations for its rule of non-retroactivity of new rules of crimi-
nal procedure: (1) applying new rules retroactively does not
advance the deterrent purpose of habeas corpus law, specifically
meaning habeas corpus usually is a way to get state courts to
abide by the United States Constitution; (2) retroactivity of new
constitutional rules frustrates judicial concern over comity and
finality; and (3) in evaluating the relative costs and benefits of
retroactivity, the costs imposed upon the states far outweigh the
benefits.252  These policies are furthered by defining a substan-
tive rule, for Teague  purposes, as only one that readjusts the con-
duct punishable as criminal.  Such a rule limits the number of
new rules being applied retroactively, advances comity and final-
ity, and does not impose such a great cost on the states.253  It also
creates far more clarity as to what constitutes a substantive ver-
sus a procedural rule.  For example, no court other than the
Ninth Circuit seriously questioned whether Ring was procedural
or substantive because on its face the decision was procedural.
Allowing courts to read into a ruling, probing around for a com-
prehensive history of the development of a criminal statute, will
result in far less finality of criminal judgments.  Courts could be-
gin splitting over what is and is not a new substantive rule, as was
the case under Ring after the Ninth Circuit’s Summerlin
decision.
In sum, the distinction between procedural and substantive
rules under Teague  greatly needed to be clarified, and was by
Schriro .  This was an area with little guidance and a significant
probability for conflicting interpretations.  The Court’s answer
came in a form that fits its precedent as well as the overall poli-
cies underlying the Teague rule.
B. The Teague “Watershed” Analysis
As discussed above, the Supreme Court concluded the Ring
252 Eric J. Beane, Note, When It Comes to Capital Sentencing, You Be the Judge:
Ring v. Arizona, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 233 (2003).
253 Additionally, retroactive application of new substantive rules that affect only
the scope of conduct punishable avoids the significant costs to the states of re-prose-
cuting individuals because, theoretically, the individual did not commit a crime.
Such is not the case with new procedural rules being applied retroactively—the state
will likely incur significant costs re-prosecuting the potentially thousands of affected
prisoners.
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rule did not fit the procedural Teague  exception, basing its entire
discussion on the fact that judicial factfinding in death-sentence
hearings did not significantly decrease the accuracy of the under-
lying sentence.  However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision not only
found that such judicial decision-making significantly decreased
the accuracy of the underlying conviction, but also that the Ring
rule was a watershed one, which must be applied retroactively.
This Part will begin by explaining why such a holding by the
Ninth Circuit had the effect of significantly lowering the bar for
retroactivity law, and will conclude with a discussion of how the
Supreme Court’s opinion, at the least, maintained the pre-Sum-
merlin  bar for retroactivity.
Language used by the Supreme Court in prior retroactivity
opinions defining and describing the procedural Teague excep-
tion illustrates its narrowness.  The new rule must be “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,”254 and it must be a “procedure[ ]
without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction [or sen-
tence] is seriously diminished.”255  The Court has further re-
quired that there be an issue of fundamental fairness.256  Only
then is the new rule a watershed one.257
Not only has the Court used language describing this exception
as narrow, but in practice it is a very narrow exception as well,
“encompassing only a handful of rulings, at least outside the
[Eighth] Amendment area.”258  Further, the Court recently
noted that it has never held a rule to apply retroactively under
this exception.259  Illustrating the narrowness of this exception,
254 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (plurality) (quoting Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)); accord  Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998); O’Dell v. Nether-
land, 521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997) (characterizing second exception as “apply[ing] only
to a small core of rules”); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997) (describing
both Teague exceptions as “narrow”); Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120 (1995)
(per curiam).
255 Teague , 489 U.S. at 312-13; see also Bousley , 523 U.S. at 620; Goeke , 514 U.S.
at 120; Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 700 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989).
256 See, e.g. , Teague , 489 U.S. at 320-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
257 See, e.g. , O’Dell , 521 U.S. at 167; Lambrix , 520 U.S. at 539-40; Goeke , 514
U.S. at 120; Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1994); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508
U.S. 333, 344-45 (1993); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 477-78 (1993); Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990).
258 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra  note 66, § 25.7, at 1121.  For an excellent listing of
the Supreme Court’s decisions illustrating how narrow this exception has been ap-
plied, as well as lower court’s decisions, see id . at 1121-24, n.27.
259 Beard v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 2514 (2004).
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the Supreme Court in O’Dell  determined that Simmons v. South
Carolina ,260 which held that a capital defendant could present
evidence of ineligibility of parole to rebut the state’s argument of
future dangerousness, did not fit the second Teague exception.261
The Court reasoned that the Simmons  rule was not “on par”
with the Court’s decision from Gideon v. Wainwright ,262 as the
petitioner had argued, and that the “narrow right of rebuttal that
Simmons  affords to defendants in a limited class of capital cases”
was not a watershed rule, as envisioned by Teague .263  Despite
the fact  that O’Dell was a capital case, the Court dismissed the
petitioner’s argument with little reasoning.  Another example of
how narrow the Court has interpreted this exception is in Goeke
v. Branch .264  In that case the Court held that “[b]ecause due
process does not require a State to provide appellate process at
all, a former fugitive’s right to appeal [denied here under a state
rule forbidding prisoners who escape following conviction to ap-
peal] cannot be said to be so central to an accurate determination
of innocence or guilt as to fall within this [second] exception to
the Teague bar.”265
There have also been a number of cases the Court has held do
not apply retroactively that might have been thought to qualify
under the second Teague exception.  An example is Sawyer v.
Smith ,266 where the Court held as non-retroactive the rule from
Caldwell v. Mississippi ,267 which states that it is constitutionally
impermissible for a prosecutor to diminish responsibility of ju-
rors in their capital-sentencing duties.268  The Court reasoned
that this rule was not within the second Teague exception be-
cause it is not an “absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness,”
although the Court did note the Caldwell rule was “directed to-
ward the enhancement of reliability and accuracy.”269
260 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
261 O’Dell , 521 U.S. at 167.
262 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
263 O’Dell ,  521 U.S. at 167.
264 514 U.S. 115 (1995).
265 Id . at 120 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
266 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
267 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).
268 Sawyer , 497 U.S. at 244.
269 Id . (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 314 (1989)).  For a listing of other
examples that the Court surprisingly did not apply retroactively, see 2 HERTZ &
LIEBMAN, supra note 66, § 25.7, at 1122 n.27 (citing examples such as Butler v. Mc-
Kellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990), Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986), and  Solem v.
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984)).
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With the fact that the second Teague exception applies to only
a “small core of rules”270 in mind, it is evident that the bar for
overcoming the presumption of non-retroactivity is extremely
high.  The Ninth Circuit’s holding that Ring is one of those rare
cases that fits the exception lowered that bar.  The finding that a
jury conducting capital sentencing increases the accuracy of the
underlying sentence, relative to the judge’s finding, essentially
devolved the “improves accuracy” element of the second excep-
tion into a policy decision.  After Ring , none of the evidence
presented will be any different.  As mentioned above, none of
the aggravating or mitigating factors have been required to be
any different.271  The difference between whether a judge or jury
is more accurate can only be decided normatively.  Further,
every argument presented by the Summerlin court that a jury is
more accurate than a judge can be countered.  Accordingly, it is
not surprising that the Ninth Circuit majority and dissent split
over this issue.272  For example, the court argued judge-based
sentencing phases are too short; the counter is that judges are
more efficient and cut to the heart of the issues.273  The court
argued the jury better reflects the community; the counter is that
the judge is more experienced and does not allow defendants
with more emotional appeal to be treated differently than the
more or less culpable defendant who has lesser counsel or a less
emotional case.274  The point is not that the Summerlin majority
was wrong in its normative belief that the jury is more accurate.
The concern is that the only way to find the jury is more accurate
than a judge is a normative policy belief about the role of the
decision-maker.  Accordingly, the Summerlin majority’s finding
on this issue turned the question of whether the new rule im-
proves the “accuracy of the proceeding” into a policy question,
depending on one’s belief about the nature of judge versus jury
decision-making.  Allowing this aspect of the second Teague ex-
ception to turn on a policy determination certainly lowers the bar
for retroactivity.
270 Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993).
271 In response to the Supreme Court’s opinion, the Arizona legislature did not
change the substance of its death penalty statute.  Rather, it merely changed who
decides the necessary aggravating and mitigating factors.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-703, 13-703.01(S)(1) (West Supp. 2003).
272 See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1110-16, 1129-31 (9th Cir. 2003).
273 See supra  Part IV.B.
274 See id .
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In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s finding that Ring was a water-
shed rule appeared to lower the retroactivity bar.  On first
glance, it may be appealing to believe a new rule affecting prison-
ers with death sentences is always a watershed rule.  However, in
cases such as Simmons  and Caldwell , that has not been the case.
Rather, even in capital cases the rule must be truly watershed.  In
Summerlin , the court argued that Ring is watershed because it is
sweeping, in that it affects every capital trial in the country.275
But as the Summerlin majority noted, Ring affected less than
one-fourth of the states’ capital sentencing structures.276  The
Ninth Circuit also argued that Ring was sweeping because it af-
fected every state that desires to sentence defendants to death,
by establishing minimal structural requirements.277  The problem
with that claim is that every new constitutional rule is creating
some kind of minimal requirement that in some way will affect
all states.  The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for why Ring  is “sweep-
ing” does not provide any limits for any other new rule of crimi-
nal procedure, thereby lowering the bar for when a rule is
retroactively applied.
In short, it is difficult to see how Ring , a case that essentially
stated “who decides” in capital sentencing, is a watershed ruling
on par with decisions like Gideon .  It does not affect every crimi-
nal trial throughout the country and it only changed the proce-
dure in less than half of the states that use capital sentencing.
Also, judges are traditionally not seen as so suspect that their
sentencing decisions render the quality of the sentence untrust-
worthy.  Given the cases that the Supreme Court has held do not
apply retroactively, holding that Ring is a watershed ruling
would have significantly lowered the bar for retroactivity on col-
lateral review.
Despite these reasons for not finding Ring to be watershed,
the Supreme Court, as noted above, held only that the Ring rule
did not seriously diminish the accuracy of Summerlin’s death sen-
tence.  It did not directly discuss the issue of whether Ring is a
“fundamental” rule that is “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.”278  But the Court’s focused discussion on the “accuracy”
275 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1119.
276 Id . at 1120.
277 Id .
278 The dissent argued that the majority’s silence on the “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty” issue is an affirmation that Ring is such a rule.  Schriro v. Summer-
lin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2527 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating “[t]he majority does
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issue under Teague ’s procedural exception appears to have main-
tained the limited nature of this exception.  Perhaps most obvi-
ously, it reaffirmed the “seriously” language of the “accuracy”
element of the “watershed” exception to Teague .  Upon close
reading of the Summerlin majority’s opinion, it seems that the
Ninth Circuit used the language that the finding must be that the
new rule “seriously” decreases the accuracy of the underlying
sentence.279  However, when the Ninth Circuit majority analyzed
the issue, the requirement of not only finding diminished accu-
racy under Ring , but seriously diminished accuracy, is nowhere
to be found.280  As a consequence of this omission, the Ninth Cir-
cuit was able to find that Ring enhanced accuracy merely by cit-
ing a few controversial empirical studies favorable to its
conclusion.281
Although the Supreme Court’s Schriro opinion apparently
only cited back to language that has been part of the Teague
analysis since the beginning,282 it maintained the extreme nar-
rowness of the Teague  procedural exception by increasing the
significance of a new rule to be one that really puts into doubt
the habeas petitioner’s conviction or sentence.  Despite the fact
that Schriro did not add substance to what exactly is a rule that
seriously decreases the accuracy of the conviction, it put a halt to
courts using policy preferences to decide whether something is
more accurate or not and hence eligible for retroactive applica-
tion.  Accordingly, this holding in Schriro will at least preserve
not deny that Ring meets the first criterion, that its holding is ‘implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty’”).  Supporting the dissent’s contention is a string citation of a
number of cases noting that the right to a jury trial is a “fundamental right,” with a
majority of the cited opinions being authored by the Schriro  majority’s writer, Jus-
tice Scalia. Id .  Potentially providing further support for such an assertion was the
majority opinion’s last paragraph, stating “[t]he right to jury trial is fundamental to
our system of criminal procedure , and States are bound to enforce the Sixth Amend-
ment’s guarantees as we interpret them.” Id . at 2526 (emphasis added).  Neverthe-
less, because the majority spoke neither here nor there to the issue, it is not clear
whether a majority of the Supreme Court would have found Ring announced a rule
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”
279 Summerlin , 341 F.3d at 1109.
280 Id . at 1109-16.
281 Id .  These studies are controversial because the dissenting opinion in Summer-
lin was able to cite the same number of studies which came to the opposite conclu-
sion of those cited by the Summerlin majority. Id . at 1129-31 (Rawlinson, J.,
dissenting).
282 The phrase “seriously diminished,” regarding the accuracy of the underlying
conviction in light of the new rule, appeared in Teague itself.  Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (plurality).
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this Teague exception for those truly watershed rules which
throw significant doubt into prisoners’ convictions and sentences.
Also significant is the Court’s rejection of a balancing ap-
proach for new rules of criminal procedure.283  Not only did the
Court implicitly reaffirm the entire Teague structure, thereby fur-
ther entrenching it in American criminal law, it rejected an ap-
proach that is attractive in cases like Summerlin’s.  As noted
above, Summerlin pushed for the rule the Court had explicitly
rejected but eventually embraced.  But as a consequence of the
Court getting the issue wrong in Walton , Summerlin was sen-
tenced to death by a drug-addled judge who may have confused
Summerlin’s case with somebody else’s.  A balancing test,
achieved by looking at the policies implicit in the writ of habeas
corpus and non-retroactivity, at least on its face, could possibly
work justice in a highly questionable case like Summerlin’s.  On
the other hand, such an approach would provide tremendous
amounts of uncertainty, and issues of retroactivity of criminal
rules of procedure can potentially affect unthinkable numbers of
convictions.  Nevertheless, the Court’s statement that it would re-
ject a balancing approach indicates that future retroactivity ques-
tions must be addressed within the Teague framework.
C. Schriro’s Effect on Determinate Sentencing
During the same term the Supreme Court handed down its rul-
ing in Schriro , the Court issued another significant ruling of crim-
inal procedure spawned from Apprendi .284  In Blakely v.
Washington ,285 the Court threw determinate sentencing struc-
tures at both the state and federal level into doubt.  Because the
Blakely  holding will affect hundreds of thousands of prisoners
throughout the country,286 the stakes are extremely high in the
retroactivity litigation of this recent decision.  This section will
briefly describe the Blakely  opinion and will then discuss the ef-
fects of Schriro  on the impending retroactivity controversy over
whether Blakely  applies retroactively.
283 See supra  Part V.B.
284 In fact, the Court decided both Blakely v. Washington  and Schriro on exactly
the same day. Compare Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), with  Schriro
v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
285 124 S. Ct. at 2531.
286 One article noted that Blakely  affects “as many as 270,000 federal cases
alone.” Benjamin Wittes, Suspended Sentencing , THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct.
2004, at 50.
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In Blakely , the Court held that judges could not upwardly de-
part from presumed sentencing ranges under a determinate sen-
tencing scheme.287  The facts of Blakely  make clear the court’s
holding.  In Blakely , the defendant kidnapped his wife, put her in
a box in the back of his pickup truck and carried her across three
western states.288  The defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree
kidnapping, which carried a maximum sentence of ten years
under Washington State law.289  However, under the state’s sen-
tencing guidelines, the defendant was eligible for a presumptive
sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three months.290  Finding one of
the state’s aggravating factors, the trial judge instead imposed a
ninety-month sentence.291
The Court found that this upward departure violated the de-
fendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.292  The ma-
jority opinion began by noting that its decision would require an
application of its Apprendi decision.293  Rejecting the state’s ar-
gument that the maximum sentence a judge may impose for pur-
poses of the Sixth Amendment is the absolute maximum
sentence allowed under state statute, including upward depar-
tures, the Court explained that “for Apprendi  purposes . . . the
maximum sentence a judge may impose” is limited solely to “the
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defen-
dant.”294  Accordingly, the maximum sentence a judge may im-
pose is not the maximum sentence allowed under state law, but
the maximum sentence allowed without requiring the judge to
find additional facts not included in the underlying crime.295  Ap-
plying this reasoning to the facts of the case, the Court found the
judge imposed an unconstitutional sentence because he relied on
factual findings not admitted in the defendant’s guilty plea, and
hence found facts beyond what was required.296  The Court fur-
ther noted that under Washington state law, had the judge not
considered facts beyond the guilty plea, his upwardly-departed
287 Blakely , 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38.
288 Id . at 2534.
289 Id . at 2534-35.
290 Id . at 2535.
291 Id .
292 Id . at 2538.
293 Id . at 2536.
294 Id . at 2537 (emphasis omitted).
295 Id . at 2537-38.
296 Id .
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sentence would have been reversed.297
The Court’s Schriro opinion will likely have a great impact on
the retroactivity analysis of Blakely , specifically on the point of
whether Blakely  will fit either of the two Teague exceptions.298
The retroactivity issues for Blakely  should be quite similar to
297 Id . at 2538.
298 Of course, this entire discussion of whether Blakely  fits either of the two
Teague  exceptions to the bar on retroactive application of new rules of criminal
procedure assumes that the Court will find Blakely  to be a “new” rule.  The Court
has announced that a rule is new if it was not “dictated  by then existing precedent”
and “was apparent to all reasonable jurists.”  Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518,
528 (1997).  Whether or not Blakely  is a new rule is an issue because as the Court
noted in Blakely , it was merely applying the rule announced in Apprendi  and was
not announcing an entirely new line of legal doctrine. Blakely , 124 S. Ct. at 2536.
Because of this, it could be argued that Blakely  did not announce a new legal rule
and that petitioners challenging their sentences on collateral review should not have
to show that Blakely  fits one of the two narrow Teague  exceptions.  Instead, they
need only show that their convictions were final after the Court announced
Apprendi .
However, two factors counter strongly against such an argument.  First, the Court
has reasoned that a strong dissent is relevant evidence indicating that reasonable
jurists could have differed as to whether prior law compelled the new rule.  Beard v.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 2512-13 (2004).  In Blakely  there was a large four-justice
group of dissenters. See Blakely , 124 S. Ct. at 2543.  Although Justice O’Connor’s
dissent criticized part of the reasoning in Apprendi , it noted that Apprendi  did not
command the outcome in Blakely . Id . at 2547-48 (interpreting Apprendi’s “statu-
tory maximum” as the maximum allowed under the statute rather than the maxi-
mum presumed sentence).  Accordingly, the Blakely dissent based its reasoning on
an interpretation of Apprendi that was contrary to that of the majority, rather than
only suggesting that Apprendi  be overturned.  Second, whether lower courts split
over whether to apply the then-existing precedent in a manner consistent with the
new rule was held to be a critical issue by the Court in Butler v. McKellar , 494 U.S.
407, 415 (1990).  As Justice O’Connor noted in her Blakely dissent, “only one court
had ever applied Apprendi to invalidate application of a guidelines scheme.”
Blakely , 124 S. Ct. at 2547 n.1 (citing sixteen federal and state opinions that found
Apprendi  did not strike down guidelines schemes).  Every single federal circuit
court considering this issue rejected that Apprendi  applied to determinate sentenc-
ing schemes the way that Blakely applied. See  United States v. Toliver, 351 F.3d 423
(9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Heltn, 349 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Johnson, 335 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); United States v. Goodine, 326
F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Piggie, 316 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Luciano, 311 F.3d 146 (2nd Cir. 2002); United States v. Randle, 304 F.3d
373 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir.
2002); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176 (3rd Cir. 2001); United States v.
Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 2001)); United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2000).  Such a weight of
opinions contrary to Blakely  provides significant evidence that Apprendi did not
dictate such a result and that the issue was open for reasonable jurists to disagree.
Not surprisingly, two courts considering this issue have found that Blakely is a
“new” rule. Morris v. United States , 333 F. Supp. 2d 759 (C.D. Ill. 2004); Lilly v.
United States , 342 F. Supp. 2d 532 (W.D. Va. 2004).
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those of the Ring holding, which were analyzed in Schriro , be-
cause both new Supreme Court rules come from the Court’s gen-
eral holding in Apprendi  and have to do with the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of a jury trial in sentencing proceedings.
Critical distinctions exist, however, which require a complete
analysis of what exactly will be the impact of the Court’s holding
in Schriro  to the impending retroactivity analysis of Blakely .
Regarding the first exception, whether Blakely  is a substantive
ruling, Schriro  appears to have ruled out any possibility that
Blakely  announced a new substantive rule of criminal law.  In
order to make an argument that Blakely  announced a new rule, a
similar argument to the one announced by the Ninth Circuit and
overruled by the Supreme Court in Schriro  would have to be
presented.299  With the Court’s clear pronouncement that the
substantive versus procedural distinction will focus on whether
the new rule regulates the “manner of determining the [criminal]
defendant’s culpability,”300 and because Blakely  does not appear
to “alter[ ] the range of conduct or the class of persons that the
law punishes,”301 it will likely not be found to be a new substan-
tive ruling under the first Teague exception.302
Schriro could also significantly impact a retroactivity analysis
of the second Teague exception to the retroactivity bar for new
rules of criminal procedure.  With the Court re-emphasizing that
a new rule must seriously diminish the accuracy of the underlying
conviction, greater emphasis will likely be placed on this “accu-
racy” issue.  Interestingly, regarding this issue, there appears to
be a critical distinction between Blakely  and Schriro , opening the
299 Specifically, the argument would be that, because the aggravating factors nec-
essary for an upward departure must be found by a jury and are the functional
equivalent of criminal elements, Blakely  reordered the structure of the underlying
crime into two separate crimes.  In Blakely’s case, it was assault for the first crime
and “aggravated” assault, leading to a higher than presumed sentence as the second
crime.  As noted above, that is exactly  the argument that was rejected by the Court
in Schriro . See supra  Part V.A.
300 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
301 Id . at 2523.
302 Not surprisingly, a number of district courts have already held as much, specif-
ically relying on Schriro ’s new formulation for determining whether a new rule is
procedural or substantive, to find that Blakely  is not a new substantive rule.  Lilly,
342 F. Supp. 2d at 537; Rosario-Dominguez v. United States, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15995, *26 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2004); United States v. Stoltz, 325 F. Supp. 2d 982,
987 (D. Minn. 2004); United States v. Lowe, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15455, *7-8
(W.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2004); Morris v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 2d 759, 771 n.8 (C.D.
Ill. 2004).
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possibility that the Court could find the accuracy of old up-
wardly-departed sentences seriously diminished, leading to the
possible holding that Blakely  must be applied retroactively.  Spe-
cifically, in Schriro , the burden of proof necessary to find the
aggravating factors to impose a death sentence was the same
both before and after the Court’s decision in Ring .  However,
after Blakely  the burden of proof will likely be higher for
sentences imposed before the Court’s decision.  In Schriro , the
burden was on the state to prove the aggravating factors to a
judge beyond a reasonable doubt,303 which is the same standard
of proof necessary for a criminal element that must be found by a
jury under the Sixth Amendment.304  Accordingly, the only dif-
ference between a person sentenced to death pre-Ring  and post-
Ring  was the fact-finder.  This is not the case under Blakely .  In
Oregon, for example, the rule for imposing an upward departure
before Blakely  was that the judge must find “substantial and
compelling reasons to upwardly depart, based on a list of aggra-
vating factors to consider.305  Post-Blakely , because the Court
treats sentencing factors subject to the Sixth Amendment like el-
ements, and therefore subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard,306 for an upward departure to be imposed a jury would
have to find the same enumerated factors beyond a reasonable
doubt.307
Although on its face the accuracy issue regarding retroactivity
of Blakely  appears to be quite similar to Ring , there is a poten-
tially critical distinction.  Quite unlike Ring, pre-Blakely  criminal
defendants may have been subject to a lower burden of proof
than defendants after Blakely , which could logically lead to a
finding that the accuracy of the old sentences is seriously dimin-
ished.  However, merely having the burden of proof elevated
from something like a “preponderance of the evidence” standard
to “beyond a reasonable doubt” may not be enough for the
Court to find the accuracy of the underlying conviction is seri-
ously  diminished. Blakely is extremely similar to Ring  in that
the large change from the rule is a different factfinder (judge to
303 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2521 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-703 (West 1978), as amended by Act of May 1, 1979, Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 144).
304 See In re  Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970).
305 OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-0001, 213-008-0002 (2003).
306 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-38 (2004); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
307 Blakely , 124 S. Ct. at 2536-38.
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jury).  The Court’s holding in Schriro that the effect on accuracy
from such a change in factfinder is too equivocal to find that the
accuracy is seriously diminished may undercut any argument that
judges are less accurate factfinders than juries and will, therefore,
force the argument to focus almost entirely on the adjusted bur-
den issue.  Further, the Court’s focusing in Schriro  on the fact
that for retroactive application there must be a finding of a seri-
ous  diminishing of accuracy means a slight shift in the burdens
may not be enough.308  This illustrates an issue that was not en-
tirely addressed by the Court in Schriro—how much of a loss of
accuracy must there be before the accuracy of the underlying
proceeding is seriously diminished? Schriro did not truly address
this issue because it focused on the fact that the evidence is
equivocal about whether judges or juries are more accurate fact-
finders.309  Unfortunately, the facts in Schriro did not present a
situation where the accuracy of the underlying conviction had un-
equivocally been lessened, so the Court had no occasion to illus-
trate what it meant by seriously  diminished accuracy.
Whether Ring fits the more general piece of the second Teague
exception, the requirement that the new rule of criminal proce-
dure be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”310 was not
specifically addressed by Schriro .311  However, Justice Breyer’s
dissent claims that the majority’s silence on this point indicates
an implicit finding that the Court’s new rule from Ring  is “im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”312  If this assertion is
true, it is possible that the Court could also find Blakely is “im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”  As noted above, both
Ring and Blakely  derive from the same holding in Apprendi ,
which is a protection of individuals’ right to a have a jury deter-
308 Recently, in Woodroffe v. Lambert , 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19457, *40-42 (D.
Or. Sept. 23, 2004), a district court in Oregon embraced this argument.  In that case,
the court held that although the petitioner’s enhanced sentence under pre-Apprendi
rules was imposed under a lower standard of proof than after Apprendi , the accu-
racy of the conviction or the enhanced sentence was still not seriously diminished.
In Woodroffe , the court examined whether Schriro  cast doubt on the Ninth Circuit’s
determination in United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes , 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Apprendi  did not fit the second Teague exception).  Nevertheless, the
court’s discussion of changing burdens of proof for a Teague analysis should apply to
Blakely .
309 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2525 (2004).
310 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality).
311 Schriro , 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2527 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
312 Id .
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mine truly factual issues in a criminal proceeding.313  This basic
principle appears to be indistinguishable in Ring and Blakely .  If
a majority of the Schriro  Court believed that Ring  dealt with a
right that is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and it
found that the accuracy of the underlying proceeding was seri-
ously diminished, as described above, then it is possible the
Court could find that Blakely applies retroactively under the sec-
ond Teague  exception.
There are at least four reasons why such a finding is un-
likely.314  First, it is a large assumption that because Schriro did
not address the issue of whether Ring announced a rule that is
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” the Court did not
dispute the issue.315  Justice Breyer’s dissent supports this asser-
tion by citing to a number of opinions that either directly or indi-
rectly state that the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee is a
fundamental right.316  But other opinions casually noting that the
Sixth Amendment jury trial right is fundamental do not necessa-
rily equate the rule to being “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” for Teague  retroactivity purposes.  As discussed above,
for the Court to find that a new rule of criminal procedure ap-
plies retroactively, it must be watershed and comparable in im-
portance to Gideon v. Wainwright .317  Therefore, “implicit in the
313 See  Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-37 (2004).
314 In fact, a number of courts have already held that Blakely  does not apply ret-
roactively. See, e.g. , United States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 2003);
Sepulveda v. United States, 330 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 2003); Coleman v. United
States, 329 F.3d 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 310 (5th
Cir. 2002); Goode v. United States, 305 F.3d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 2002); Curtis v.
United States, 294 F.3d 841, 844 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d
1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002); McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1256-57 (11th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 151 (4th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th
Cir. 2000); In re  Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
315 The following discussion points out the logical reasons to believe Justice
Breyer made a large assumption.  When it comes to counting Supreme Court jus-
tices, it may not be such a “large” assumption.  It is true, of course, that four other
justices signed off on Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, implying that at least four
justices believe that the Sixth Amendment guarantee underlying Ring  and Blakely  is
a fundamental one, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.  This means that only
one justice from the Schriro  majority must believe that the new rule from Blakely  is
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
316 Schriro , 124 S. Ct. at 2527 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring)); Blakely , 124 S. Ct. at 2536; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring)); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989)
(plurality); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968)).
317 See supra  note 83 and accompanying text.
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concept of ordered liberty” in the habeas corpus retroactivity
context does not mean that a right is generally fundamental.
Rather, it seems that the new rule must be extremely rare and
special in some way.318  This perspective on the type of rule the
Court would apply retroactively seems to be substantiated by the
Court’s discussion in Beard v. Banks  of the rarity of rules it will
find apply retroactively, where the Court noted it has not yet
found a rule that fits the second Teague  exception.319
Second, and similar to the first problem, Blakely  did not an-
nounce a rule that is entirely unprecedented and new to criminal
procedural jurisprudence.320  In Blakely  the Court noted that it
was merely applying its holding from Apprendi  to the context of
a determinate sentencing scheme.321  The Court was quite clear
that it was not announcing a previously unheard-of legal doc-
trine.  Instead, Blakely  was another logical, albeit surprising, ex-
tension of the principle announced in Apprendi .  Although the
Court has never announced that an extension (or new applica-
tion) of a previously established legal rule cannot be one that is
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” which rises to the
level of watershed, it is difficult to conceive of the Court describ-
ing the second Teague  exception as only applying to a “small
core of rules”322 but then finding that an extension of a previ-
ously announced concept is such a rule.  In other words, because
Blakely  is a mere variant of Apprendi , it seems unlikely that it
could be found to be a watershed ruling of criminal procedure.
Third, Blakely  will likely be subject to harmless-error analysis,
a critical consideration in whether a new rule is one “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.”  The Ninth Circuit recently ex-
plained how Sixth Amendment jury rights being subject to harm-
less-error analysis is weighty evidence that such rules do not fit
the second Teague  exception:
Our decisions that subjected Apprendi claims to harmless er-
ror analysis or plain error review lend additional support to
318 See, e.g. , Beard v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 2513-14 (2004); O’Dell v. Nether-
land, 521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993); Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990).
319 Beard , 124 S. Ct. at 2513-14.  Note that the Court’s formulation of the second
Teague  exception in Beard  seems to be an especially arduous characterization of the
second Teague  exception.
320 For the double meaning of “new” that arises in the Teague  context see supra
note 298.
321 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-37 (2004).
322 O’Dell , 521 U.S. at 157.
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our determination that Apprendi is not a bedrock procedural
rule.  In these cases, we did not consider Apprendi errors to be
structural.  A structural error is one that necessarily renders a
trial fundamentally unfair and therefore invalidates the con-
viction.  We only review for plain error or assess whether an
error is harmless when the error is not structural; in those cir-
cumstances, the court must determine whether any substantial
rights were prejudiced by the error.  By applying harmless er-
ror analysis or plain error review to Apprendi  claims, we have
necessarily held that Apprendi errors do not render a trial fun-
damentally unfair.323
As noted above, Blakely  is a derivative of Apprendi , and it
appears that a Blakely  claim will be subject to harmless-error re-
view because it is not a structural error that renders the entire
trial or sentencing fundamentally unfair.  In fact, one Ninth Cir-
cuit panel recently conducted harmless-error review of a Blakely
error, implying that Blakely , like Apprendi , is subject to such re-
view, providing significant evidence that Blakely  is not a water-
shed rule.324
Fourth, there are pragmatic reasons to believe the Court will
avoid finding that Blakely  fits the second Teague  exception.  One
commentator reported that Blakely  would affect up to 270,000
federal cases.325  In addition, if the Court holds that Blakely  ap-
plies retroactively, federal habeas corpus statutory law allows
both state and federal prisoners to file successive petitions.326
This means that prisoners who have already challenged their con-
victions and sentences in federal court and lost will be allowed to
bring an entirely new case to have their unconstitutional
323 United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 670-71 (2002).
324 See  United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 972 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
Blakely  error requires reversal and resentencing under either plain-error or harm-
less-error standard).  In Tyler v. Cain , 533 U.S. 656, 666 (2002), the Supreme Court
explained that not even all structural-error rules fit into Teague ’s procedural excep-
tion.  This implies that the second Teague  exception is even narrower than the cate-
gory of structural-error rules. See also  United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 150
(4th Cir. 2001) (noting that the fact the claim is subject to harmless and plain error
indicates it is not a watershed change in criminal procedure and emphasizing that
“finding something to be a structural error would seem to be a necessary predicate
for a new rule to apply retroactively under Teague”).
325 Wittes, supra  note 286.
326 See  28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(a) (2000), which states
A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application
under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be
dismissed unless . . . the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
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sentences overturned.  Such a scenario would mean that
sentences imposed as far back as the early 1980s, when the fed-
eral and state governments began implementing determinate sen-
tencing structures,327 would be subject to review.  This could lead
to a massive flood of convicted criminals being let out in one
large wave.  Because of the potential political and economic ef-
fects associated with a finding, it seems unlikely the Court would
issue such a decision.
CONCLUSION
The entire case of Warren Wesley Summerlin was unfortunate,
beginning with the crime itself and concluding with the Supreme
Court’s overturning itself on an issue Summerlin had argued fif-
teen years earlier.  The issue presented to the Court, however,
was not a factual or policy issue about whether Mr. Summerlin
deserved his death sentence.  Rather, the issue presented in this
case was purely a legal one.  More particularly, it was about what
the Supreme Court did in Ring v. Arizona .328
In determining whether Ring applied retroactively, the Ninth
Circuit applied the well-accepted Teague test.  This Teague test
has placed a very high hurdle in front of federal habeas corpus
petitioners to have a new rule of constitutional criminal proce-
dure applied retroactively.  Surprisingly, in applying the Teague
test the Ninth Circuit held that Ring  was a new substantive rul-
ing, thus applying retroactively.  Alternatively, the court held
that if the new rule announced in Ring  is seen as procedural,
then it was a new watershed rule that improved the accuracy of
the underlying proceeding.  In so holding, the Ninth Circuit ad-
ded to confusion regarding when a new rule is substantive, and it
significantly lowered the bar for when a procedural rule is ap-
plied retroactively.
From a legal standpoint, the Supreme Court fortunately
granted certoriari and overturned the Ninth Circuit.  In so doing,
the Court cleaned up the framework for Teague issues and pro-
vided significant clarification on the distinction between substan-
tive and procedural rules of criminal law.  The Court’s distinction
is clear, workable, and perhaps most importantly, follows the
spirit and underlying policy rationales for the Teague doctrine of
327 See  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 549-50 (2000) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
328 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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retroactivity.  The Court also provided clarification for the proce-
dural exception to the Teague bar of retroactivity.  It held that
new rules must not only diminish the accuracy of the underlying
proceeding, but new rules must seriously  do so to be applied ret-
roactively.  This holding not only stayed within the bounds of al-
ready-existing Teague jurisprudence, but also maintained the
narrowness of the Teague procedural exception.  Accordingly,
the Schriro Court took great strides towards protecting finalized
convictions.  Its opinion also reserves the finding of watershed
rules for the extremely rare cases that are truly “ground-
breaking.”329
This holding will prove important as federal courts will now
have to deal with whether to apply Blakely , the Supreme Court’s
most recent new rule of criminal procedure, retroactively.
Schriro  will make it very difficult to find that the rule from
Blakely  announced a new substantive rule.  However, Blakely
will provide interesting accuracy issues that will likely force the
Court to further define what constitutes a serious diminishing of
the accuracy of the underlying proceeding.  If it is found that the
rule from Blakely  seriously diminished the accuracy of prior
sentences, the Court will also have to deal with the difficult issue
of whether Blakely  is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”
Although the possibility is definitely there for the Court to an-
nounce such a holding, several legal and pragmatic factors make
that an unlikely result.  Whatever the result, future retroactivity
cases will address Blakely , will be heavily influenced by
Schriro—and will further define the factors discussed in the
Court’s opinion.
329 See  O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997).
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